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A HANDS-OFF APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS
DOCTRINE: WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?
Richard W Garnett*
INTRODUCTION

At the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American Association of Law
Schools, the program organized by the Section on Law and Religion
presented for consideration the claim that "the United States
Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in
deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice
and belief."1 The Court, it was proposed, is-more and more-taking
2
a "hands-off approach to religious doctrine."
© 2009 Richard W. Garnett. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Essay in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. This paper was prepared for
presentation at the program of the Section on Law and Religion at the Annual
Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools in January, 2008. I am grateful
to Rob Vischer and Sam Levine for conceiving and coordinating the program, to my
fellow presenters-Chris Eisgruber, Andy Koppelman, and Bernadette Meyler-for
their stimulating papers, to Kent Greenawalt for his typically thoughtful responses to
the presentations and for setting such a wonderful example for all of us who aspire to
be careful and thoughtful scholars, to my Notre Dame Law School colleagues who
engaged and pushed me when I presented a version of this paper at a faculty
workshop, to Tony Bellino for his assistance with research, and to the editors and staff
of the Notre Dame Law Review for their hard work and patience.
1 Ass'n of Am. Law Sch., Annual Meeting: Reassessing Our Roles as Scholars and
Educators in Light of Change, http://www.aals.org/am2008/friday/index.html (last
visited Nov. 20, 2008) [hereinafter Program].
2 See id.; see also Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts
over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1843, 1844 (1998) ("The Supreme Court's
basic constitutional approach.., is that secular courts must not determine questions
of religious doctrine and practice."); Samuel J. Levine, Rethinking the Supreme Court's
Hands-OffApproach to Questions of Religious Practiceand Belief 25 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 85,
85 (1997) ("In recent years, the United States Supreme Court has shown an increasing unwillingness to engage in deciding matters that relate to the interpretation of
religious practice and belief.").
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This proposal was, and remains, timely and important, as is illustrated by-to mention just a few, diverse examples-the ongoing
property-ownership dispute between several "breakaway" Episcopal
churches in Virginia, on the one hand, and the Episcopal Diocese of
Virginia, on the other;3 by the Supreme Court of Canada's recent ruling that an agreement regarding a religious divorce under Jewish law
is enforceable in civil courts; 4 by a federal judge's ruling that the
Georgia Institute of Technology had unconstitutionally taken on the
task of instructing students about the merits of various traditions' positions on sexual morality;5 and perhaps even by the Speaker of the
House's controversial pronouncements, on "Meet the Press," about
Roman Catholic teaching with respect to abortion. 6 In each of these
controversies, a government actor is being asked to decide a question,
or has presumed to resolve a dispute, involving the meaning or content of religious teaching.
But, such examples notwithstanding, is the proposed claim true?
That is, is it really the case that American courts are showing such an
"increasing unwillingness," and that they are doing so in accord with
any identifiable principle or "approach"? 7 If there is, in the Court's
3 See, e.g., Julia Duin, Judge Rules in Favor of Breakaway Groups, WASH. TIMES, Aug.
21, 2008, at A3.
4 See, e.g., Zvi Halpern & Michelle Landy, Court Upholds Civil Rights Against Religious Doctrine, TORONTO STAR, Dec. 21, 2007, at AA08; see also Bruker v. Marcovitz,
[2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, 2007 SCC 54 (Can.) (enforcing get obtained from rabbinical
court on the basis that it constituted a civil contract).
5 See Sklar v. Clough, No. 1:06-CV-0627-JOF, slip op. at 83-84 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 29,
2008); see also Scott Jaschik, Gay Rights vs. Religious Rights, INSIDE HIGHER ED, May 2,
2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/05/02/gatech (summarizing the
Sklar decision and reactions on both sides of the holding). As Eugene Volokh
commented:
The Georgia Tech Safe Space training program materials (both printed
handouts and Web materials) were apparently aimed at helping gays and
lesbians feel comfortable and safe on campus, an eminently plausible goal.
But they tried to accomplish this by taking stands on quintessentially theological questions-e.g., the true meaning of the Bible, and the "legitima[cy]" of various interpretations of "Biblical texts"-something the
Establishment Clause has been read as prohibiting.
Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/posts/1217
540045.shtml (July 31, 2008, 17:34 EST) (alteration in original). For another case
presenting similar questions, see Citizens for a Responsible Curriculum v. Montgomery
County Public Schools, No. Civ. A. AW-05-1194, 2005 WL 1075634 (D. Md. May 5, 2005)
(holding that defendant's new curriculum endorsing a homosexual lifestyle likely violates plaintiffs First Amendment freedoms).
6 See, e.g., Julia Duin, Catholic Bishops Assail Pelosi over Her Remarks on Abortion,
WASH. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2008, at Al.
7 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 2, at 85.
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law-and-religion toolkit, something like a hands-off "rule," then what
are that rule's scope, content, and justifications?8 Which feared
harms does it protect against, and which goods does it promote?
When it comes to "matters that relate to the interpretation of religious
practice and belief,"9 why is the Court doing, and should it be doing,
what it is doing?

Step back for a moment, seventeen centuries or so. As fans of the
Da Vinci Code are (in a way) aware, 10 in the year 325, the Arian Controversy was raging.1 1 The Emperor Constantine, a convert to Christianity, was troubled by the strife among Christians and-perhaps more
acutely-by the civil unrest that in many places accompanied their
theological disagreements.1 2 Accordingly, he asked Christian bishops
from around the world to gather for an ecumenical council, in present-day Turkey, to restore both religious concord and civil peace.
Today, Constantine's move no doubt seems to most people a perfect example of that which the political authority cannot do and,
indeed, should have no interest in doing. Most of us probably think
that for the civil magistrate to inquire into-to even imagine the right
or competence to inquire into-the "truth or falsity" of religious
claims and doctrines is, as the Supreme Court put it in United States v.
Ballard,13 to enter a "forbidden domain. 1 4 We are confident that disputes over doctrine-disputes such as, for example, the fourth cen8

See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 16-17), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1268406 (proposing a "religion-protective" argument that is able
to "provide[] a powerful reason for government, as a general matter, to keep its
hands off religious doctrine").
9 Program, supra note 1.
10 See generally DAN BROWN, THE DA VINCI CODE (2003).
11 The "Arian Controversy" was a "controversy over Christ's divinity, which
erupted with violent intensity during the reign of Constantine when the presbyter
Arius of Alexandria challenged his bishop, Alexander, on the question of God the
Son's relation to God the Father." THOMAS BOKENKOTrER, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE
WM. & MARY L. REv.

CATHOLIC CHURCH

58 (1977); cf. PETER

BROWN, THE RISE OF WESTERN CHRISTENDOM

40-41 (1977) (describing the hostility between Arius and Alexander giving rise to the
Arian Controversy); 1 JAROStAV PELIKAN, THE CHRISTIAN TRADITION 200-03 (1971)
(same).
12 See BOKENKOTTER, supra note 11, at 61 ("With the unity of the Church at stake,
Constantine convoked the first ecumenical council, which met at Nicaea in 325.").
13 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
14 Id. at 87. For a close study of the Ballard case, see JOHN T. NOONAN, THE
LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 141-76
(1998).
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tury argument over the divinity of Christ-are, as the Court insisted in
16
Watson v. Jones,1 5 "strictly and purely ecclesiastical in ...character."'
In every involvement or interference by government officials in "controversies over religious doctrine and practice," 17 we think, the
"hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely
ecclesiastical concern."' 8 Religion is, after all, a "private matter." 19
But, is it really? Or, is it entirely? And, even if it is, so what?
Presumably, with respect to the particular "controvers[y] over religious doctrine and practice" 20 that occasioned the first Council at
Nicaea, Constantine was not mistaken in perceiving that his Christian
subjects' strong views on the matter-and their equally strong view
that the question did matter-were not unrelated to, and could not be
neatly separated from, eminently "secular" matters about which he
was quite, and appropriately, concerned. Even with the benefit of
hindsight, there is no reason to dispute what must have been the
Emperor's view, namely, that the social and political order under his
charge-to say nothing of his subjects' salvation-would be well
served if the Arian Controversy were resolved. And so, why, exactly,
do his concerns, and his actions, strike us as strange, even illegitimate?
They are not, after all, without contemporary parallels, or progeny. Yes, it is hard to imagine President Obama convening a council
of Episcopalian bishops, and asking them-in the interest of preserving public peace (and tasteful music)-to resolve their various disputes. 2 1 And yet, we can imagine-we no longer have a choice-the
People's Republic of China enacting a law purporting to regulate the
reincarnation of the Dalai Lama. 22 This law certainly invades what we
and our Supreme Court regard, again, as a "forbidden domain." And
yet, is it so clear that the matter of the reincarnation of living lamas is
"purely ecclesiastical," and does not touch directly on the Chinese
state's "secular" interest in maintaining and strengthening its
chokehold on Tibet? We might be amused, bewildered, or troubled
15
16
17

80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
Id. at 733.
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,

393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).

Id.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971).
PresbyterianChurch, 393 U.S. at 449.
See, e.g., Neela Banerjee, Episcopal Church Remains Divided on Gay Issues, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 22, 2007, at A9.
22 See, e.g., Jane Macartney, China Tells Living Buddhas to Obtain Permission Before
They Reincarnate,TIMES (LONDON), Aug. 4, 2007, at 36.
18
19
20
21
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by USAID's "mullahs on a bus" program in Central Asia, which "typically brings together about a dozen religious leaders who spend a day
on a bus visiting various U.S.-funded projects and hearing directly
from beneficiaries of the positive work the United States undertakes
in a variety of fields. ' 23 And yet, it is not obvious that we should reject
out of hand the program's premise, namely, that our government's
interests-our interests-are well served by actions that soothe antiAmerican sentiments in Central Asia's Muslim communities. 24 When
a majority of Canada's Supreme Court affirmed that agreements to
remove religious barriers to remarriage are enforceable in civil courts,
they did so-they insisted-in order to vindicate "Canada's approach
to religious freedom, to equality rights, [and] to divorce and remarriage generally";25 the Court's stated aim was not to decide a religious
question or enforce a religious duty but rather to uphold the "demo26
cratic values, public order and the general well-being of" citizens.
The purpose of Georgia Tech's abovementioned "Safe Space" program-to "help [ gays and lesbians feel comfortable and safe on campus"2 7 -was
"eminently plausible ' 28 and, it would seem, entirely
secular, 29 even if it did involve functionaries talking theology. And so
on.
It is easy to agree, at least at first, with Justice Brennan's warning,
nearly forty years ago, in the Presbyterian Church case, that "[if civil
courts undertake to resolve [doctrinal] controversies . . . the hazards

are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. 3 0° Indeed, as I have observed elsewhere, his statement
23 SeeJessica Powley Hayden, Note, Mullahs on a Bus: The Establishment Clause and
U.S. Foreign Aid, 95 GEO. LJ. 171, 177 (2006).
24 Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Misery and Company, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 22, 2008, at 39,
41 (reviewing MARC SAGEMAN, LEADERLESS JIHAD: TERROR NETWORKS IN THE TwENTYFIRST CENTURY (2008) and acknowledging the "importance of introducing moderation into both offline and online discussions among Muslims").
25
id. at
lated
riage
most

See Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607, 636, 2007 SCC 54 (Can.); see also
641 ("The significant intrusions into our constitutionally and statutorily articucommitments to equality, religious freedom and autonomous choice in marand divorce that flow from the breach of his legal obligation are what weigh
heavily against him.").

26

See id. at 640.

27

See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 5.

28

See id.

29

See id.

30 Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church,
393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969)
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"seems wise and fittingly cautious, even unremarkable and obvious."3 1
It turns out, though, to be "intriguing, elusive, and misleading"3 2 :
Far from being "purely ecclesiastical concerns," . . . the content
of religious doctrine and the trajectory of its development might
instead be matters to which even a liberal, secular, and democratic
state reasonably could, and perhaps should, attend....
[And so,] Justice Brennan's warning presents "hazards" of its
own, and... its premises-if uncritically embraced-subtly distort
our constitutional discourse. The meaning, movement, and implications of religious teachings are and have been both the subjects
and objects of government power and policy. In the end, government like ours are not, and cannot be, "neutral" with respect to
religion's claims. And it is precisely because secular, liberal, democratic governments have an "interest" in the content... of religious
doctrine-an interest that such governments will, if permitted,
33
quite understandably pursue-that religious freedom is so fragile.
I try to flesh out this claim below. For now, the point is a simple
one: even assuming there are some matters, problems, questions, or
controversies that are so entirely "private" that the public authority
could not conceivably have an appropriately secular interest in
addressing them, we should not conclude too quickly that disputes
involving or about religious doctrine are among them.
II.
All that duly said and noted, it would be both mulish and idle to
deny that, in our political community, government arms and actors
(including courts) steer well clear of theological disputes; they avoid
(perhaps to a fault 34 ) excessive entanglement with the governance
and doctrines of religious communities, institutions, and traditions.
And, this reluctance is well pedigreed. Professor Tribe cites the
refusal, described in the Acts of the Apostles, of Gallio, a Roman proconsul in Greece, to judge a complaint that Paul was "inducing people to
31

Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, Toleration, and the State's Interest in the Develop-

ment of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REv. 1645, 1647 (2004); cf. Levine, supra note 2,
at 88 ("[I]t is sensible that courts should not serve as a theology board and should try
to refrain from judicially imposed religious interpretation.").
32 Garnett, supra note 31, at 1648.
33 Id. at 1649-50 (footnotes omitted).
34 See Levine, supra note 2, at 86 (suggesting that the Court's "increasing refusal
to consider carefully the religious questions central to many cases" could "lead to a
number of disturbing results").
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worship God contrary to the law."35 "Ifit were a matter of some crime
or malicious fraud," Gallio said to Paul's accusers, "I should with reason hear [your] complaint... ; but since it is a question of arguments
over doctrine . . .and your own [that is, Jewish] law, see to it your-

selves. I do not wish to be ajudge of such matters."3 6 ForJohn Locke,
"the power of civil government relates only to .. .civil interests, is

confined to the care of the things of this world, and hath nothing to
do with the world to come.

'37

Somewhat closer to home, but in a

similar vein, is James Madison's well-known, indignant insistence that
it is "arrogant pretension[,] falsified by the contradictory opinions of
Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world," to think that "the Civil
Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth."3 8
With respect to the Court's precedents and the relevant constitutional doctrines, a good place to start is with the Presbyterian Church
case, one that, in many ways, now seems to presage the earlier mentioned contemporary controversy involving divisions in the Episcopal
Church. 39 Two Presbyterian churches in Savannah, Georgia had
decided to withdraw from the Presbyterian Church in the United
States, believing that the Church had departed from settled doctrine,
fallen into theological error, and generally been seduced by liberalism. After Church officials moved to "take over the local churches'
property ...until new local leadership could be appointed,' 40 the two
35

See LAURENCE H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

§ 14-11, at 1237 n.73

(2d ed. 1988) (citing Acts 18:12-16).
36
37

Acts 18:14-16 (New American Bible).
A LETTER CONCERNING

TOLERATION (1689), reprinted in 5 THE
52, 53 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Of
course, for Locke, the "care of things of this world" comprehended many things that
we today, like Justice Brennan in the Presbyterian Church case, would likely regard as
being of "purely ecclesiastical concern." Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); see 2 KENT GREENAWALT,
JOHN LOCKE,

FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION

RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION

20-21 (2008) (noting that Locke did not argue for

complete or total establishment).
38 James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments

(1785), in SELECTED

WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON

21,

5, at 24 (Ralph Ketcham ed.,

2006).
39 The discussion that follows, of Presbyterian Church and other "no religious decisions" decisions, appeared earlier in Garnett, supra note 31, at 1646-59. For other
detailed examinations of these decisions, see, for example, John E. Fennelly, Property
Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the Church?, 9 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 319, 319-30
(1997); Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1846-63; Levine, supra note 2, at 88-92; Robert
E. Rodes, Jr., The Last Days of Erastianism-Formsin the American Church-State Nexus, 62
HARV. THEOLOGCAL REv. 301, 307-17 (1969); Louis J. Sirico, Jr., Church Property Disputes: Churches as Secular and Alien Institutions, 55 FoRDHAM L. REv. 335, 338 (1986).
40 See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 443.
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local congregations turned not to "higher church tribunals,"' 4 1 but
instead to the Superior Court of Chatham County, Georgia. 42 There,
they filed separate suits "to enjoin the general church from trespass'43
ing on the disputed property.
Eventually, a jury accepted the local churches' claim that the
Church's allegedly heterodox teachings and actions "amount[ed] to a
fundamental or substantial abandonment of [the Church's] original
tenets and doctrines, ' 44 and that the Church had therefore violated its
obligation, under a trust of local church property implied in Georgia
law, 4 5 to "adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time

of affiliation by the local churches. ' 46 Accordingly, the trial judge
concluded that the implied trust had terminated, and with it the
Church's right to occupy or otherwise interfere with the local church
property in question. 4 7 In other words, the Church had lost its rights
to and over the local church property by embracing and teaching
"new" religious tenets and doctrines, and forsaking the originals.
The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the First Amendment does not "permit a civil court to award church property on the
basis of the interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to
aspects of church doctrine."4 8 Writing for a unanimous Court, 49 Justice Brennan acknowledged that "[i] t is of course true that the State
has a legitimate interest in resolving property disputes," 50 that "a civil
court is a proper forum for that resolution," 5 1 and that "there are neu'5 2
tral principles of law[] developed for use in all property disputes.
Nonetheless, he insisted that "it [is] wholly inconsistent with the
American concept of the relationship between church and state to
permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions," 53 warning
41

Id.

42

See id.

43

Id.

44 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
45 Id. at 444. The case's implied-trust and departure-from-doctrine theory
"derives from principles fashioned by English courts." Id. at 443 n.2.
46 Id. at 443. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed. Presbyterian Church v. E.
Heights Presbyterian Church, 159 S.E.2d 690, 701 (Ga. 1968).
47 See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 444.
48 See id. at 441, 444.
49 Justice Harlan wrote separately, to clarify a specific point, but nonetheless concurred in Justice Brennan's opinion. See id. at 452 (Harlan, J., concurring).
50 Id. at 445 (majority opinion).
51 Id.
52 Id. at 449.
53 Id. at 445-46 (discussing Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872)); see
also id. at 450 ("[T]he departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust
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that it "'would lead to the total subversion of... religious bodies'- 54 if
decisions about church doctrine, made by church authorities, could
be appealed to the "'secular courts." 55 That is, it cannot be up to a
government official to decide whether a church has sold out its theological patrimony, exchanged it for faddish doctrinal novelties, and
therefore forfeited its interest in local trust property. Such decisions
and inquiries, Justice Brennan asserted, are wholly inimical to the
"'spirit of freedom for religious organizations"' that animates our
First Amendment. 56 Rather, our Constitution guarantees to such
organizations "'an independence from secular control or manipulation' " 57 and the "'power to decide for themselves, free from state
interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith
58
and doctrine.' "
Presbyterian Church is one of a cluster of cases that seem to illustrate and confirm the hands-off rule, or what Eugene Volokh calls the
"no religious decisions" principle. 59 Nearly a century earlier, in Watson v. Jones6° the Court had similarly refused "to decree the termination of an implied trust because of departures from doctrine by [a]
national [Presbyterian] organization." 61 In that case, which did not
involve the interpretation and application of the First Amendment,
62
but was "nonetheless informed by First Amendment considerations,"
theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion-the
interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines
to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a
role."); id. at 449 ("First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church
property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies
over religious doctrine and practice.").
54 Id. at 446 (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729).
55 Id. (quoting Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729).
56 See id. at 448 (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952)).
57 Id. (quoting Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116).
58 Id. (quoting Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116).

59

EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT

853-63 (2d ed. 2005). Professor

Tribe, in his treatise, treats these cases, and this "principle," primarily under the heading of the prohibition on excessive entanglement, TRIBE, supra note 35, § 14-11, at
1226-specifically, "doctrinal entanglement in religious issues"-between government and religion. Id. § 14-11, at 1231.
60 The Watson case is discussed in some detail in Kedroff 344 U.S. at 110-17.
61 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 445.
62 Id. at 445 & n.4. As the Presbyterian Church Court noted, several post-Watson
"nonconstitutional" decisions-while "recogniz[ing] that there might be some circumstances in which marginal civil court review of ecclesiastical determinations would
be appropriate," id. at 447-reiterated the notion that "'[i]n the absence of fraud,
collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
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the Justices observed, among other things, that "[t]he law knows no
63
heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma."
These and similar "considerations" were clearly constitutionalized
in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral,64 a fascinating and politically delicate case arising out of a dispute within the Russian Orthodox
Church. 65 New York's legislature had purported to "transfer the control of the New York churches of the Russian Orthodox religion from
the central governing hierarchy of the Russian Orthodox Church...
66
to the governing authorities of the Russian Church in America."
The Court concluded that "[s]uch a law violates the Fourteenth
Amendment. It prohibits in this country the free exercise of religion." 67 The Justices were unimpressed by the fact that, in so doing,
purely ecclesiastical ... are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive,'" id. (quoting Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929)).
63 Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728-29 (1872).
64 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
65 See id. at 95.
66 Id. at 107.
67 Id. But see id. at 130 (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("[The law] has not interfered
with . . .anyone's exercise of his religion. New York has not outlawed the Sovietcontrolled sect nor forbidden it to exercise its authority or teach its dogma in any
place whatsoever except on this piece of property ....").
As the Court's discussion of the relevant facts makes clear, the underlying dispute
within the church-and the New York legislature's efforts to address and resolve it-is
difficult to separate from the "political disturbances which culminated ... in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917," id. at 102 (majority opinion), later relations between the
church and the Soviet government, and relations between that government and the
United States. Interestingly, the Justices noted that the New York Court of Appeals
had taken judicial notice that "the Russian Government exercised control over the
central church authorities and that the American church [had] acted to protect its
pulpits and faith from such influences," and had also stated that the "Legislature's
reasonable belief in such conditions justified the State in enacting a law to free the
American group from infiltration of such atheistic or subversive influences," id. at
108-09; see also id. at 117 ("The Court of Appeals of New York recognized, generally,
the soundness of the philosophy of ecclesiastical control of church administration
and polity but concluded that the exercise of that control was not free from legitimate
interference."). And, the Supreme Court likewise seems to have been wary of the
"dangers" of "subversive action" and "political use of church pulpits." Id. at 109; see
also id. at 127 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("[W]e have an ostensible religious schism with
decided political overtones."); id. at 131 ("I do not think New York law must yield to
the authority of a foreign and unfriendly state masquerading as a spiritual
institution.").
In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter elaborated on the fear of "political
religion," noting that the "fear, perhaps not wholly groundless, that the loyalty of its
citizens might be diluted by their adherence to a church entangled in antagonistic
political interests, reappears in history as the ground for interference by civil government with religious attachments." Id. at 123-24 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). By way
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the legislature had required the New York churches to continue to
adhere to traditional doctrine and practices; 68 after all, "[s] hould the
state assert power to change the statute requiring conformity to
ancient faith and doctrine to one establishing a different doctrine, the
invalidity would be unmistakable.

'69

As Justice Frankfurter framed

the matter in his concurrence, " [w] hat is at stake here is the power to
exercise religious authority"; 70 and, he insisted, "[t] he judiciary has
heeded, naturally enough, the menace to a society like ours of
attempting to settle such religious struggles by state action. '71 In the
end, "it is not open to the governments of this Union to reinforce the
loyalty of their citizens by deciding who is the true exponent of their
72

religion."
73
And, in the 1976 Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich,

the Court overturned a decision by the Illinois Supreme Court that
purported to review the procedural and substantive merits of the pro74
ceedings through which that church "defrocked" one of its bishops.
The Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the Serbian
75
Orthodox Church had "suspended and ultimately removed
Milivojevich as Bishop of the American-Canadian Diocese of that
Church and he, in turn, had challenged that action in the civil courts
of Illinois. 76 As Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, put the mat-

ter, "[t]he basic dispute [was] over control of the [Diocese], its property and assets."'77 With respect to that dispute, the Supreme Court of
Illinois concluded that the Bishop's "removal and defrockment had to
of illustration, Justice Frankfurter reminded his readers that "[i]t was on this basis,
after all, that Bismarck sought to detach German Catholics from Rome by a series of
laws not too different in purport from that before us today." Id. at 124.
68 Id. at 108 (majority opinion).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 121 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
71 Id. at 122. Justice Frankfurter emphasized also that legislatures have no
power "to settle conflicts of religious authority and none to define religious obedience." Id.
72 Id. at 125.
73 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
74 Id. at 698.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 697-98. His "immediate reaction," actually, was to "refuse to accept the
[decisions of the Mother Church] on the ground that [they] contravened the administrative autonomy of the Diocese guaranteed by the Diocesan constitution." Id. at
704. After several rounds of Church proceedings, he filed suit in Lake County, Illinois. Id. at 704-07.
77 Id. at 698. Justices Rehnquist and Stevens, dissenting, took a strikingly different view of the case's history and basic nature. See id. at 726 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (describing the issue in the case as simply determining the "real Bishop of the...
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were not con-

ducted according to the [court's] interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal code." 78 However, and relying heavily on
PresbyterianChurch, Watson, and Kedroff7 Justice Brennan insisted that
the Illinois Court's decision was unconstitutional in that it "rest[ed]
upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitute[d] its own inquiry into church
polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes."80
The animating themes of these church-property and intrachurchdispute cases run through and appear over and again in the Court's
decisions on the Religious Clauses. It is blackletter law that courts
may not render "religious" decisions and should "rarely help[] to
enforce religious standards or demand[] that people perform actions
whose significance relates to religious obligations."' 8 1 They may not
decide whether a person's religious beliefs are true or orthodox: "Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution," Justice Douglas proclaimed
in Ballard. "Men may believe what they cannot prove."8

2

Variations

on this theme run through the case law: public officials may inquire
into the sincerity, but not the consistency, reasonableness, or orthodoxy of religious beliefs. 83 Courts are cautious when inquiring into
Diocese" through "application of... canon law," without the injection of preference
into the matter).
78 Id. at 708 (majority opinion).
79 Cf id. at 727 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The cases upon which the Court
relies are not a uniform line of authorities leading inexorably to reversal of the Illinois judgment."); id. at 733 ("The rule of those cases ... is that the government may
not displace the free religious choices of its citizens by placing its weight behind a
particular religious belief, tenet, or sect.").
80 Id. at 708 (majority opinion). InJustice Brennan's view, "this case essentially
involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which
under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals." Id. at 709. Quoting his
own concurrence in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God at Sharpsburg,Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam) ,Justice Brennan warned that
"'[t]o permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within
a [hierarchical] church so as to decide.., religious law [governing church polity] ...
would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination
of religious doctrine."' Serbian E. OrthodoxDiocese, 426 U.S. at 709 (latter alterations in
original) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 369 (Brennan, J., concurring)).
81 Kent Greenawalt, Religious Law and Civil Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 781, 781 (1998).
82 See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); see also Watson v.Jones, 80
U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872) ("The law knows no heresy .... ).
83 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981) ("[Rleligious beliefs
need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to
merit First Amendment protection."); Ballard, 322 U.S. at 86-88 (holding that the
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the "centrality" of a particular religious belief or practice.8 4 The Constitution does not permit state action that creates or requires "excessive entanglement" between the government and religious
institutions, practices, and teachings.8 5 It commands that "secular and
religious authorities . . . not interfere with each other's respective
spheres of choice and influence."8 6 As Kent Greenawalt has put it,
"[g] overnment must keep out of internal problems of religious bodies
8' 7
when those problems concern religious understandings.
Perhaps, then, the task presented to the Section on Law and
Religion's program was an easy one; perhaps our work here is done.
Yes, courts are, and should be, "unwilling[] to engage in deciding
matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice and
belief'; 8 8 they do, and should, take a "hands-off approach to religious
doctrine. '89 This sensible reticence is not only required by the Constitution's Religion Clauses; it also protects and promotes the religiousfreedom commitments those Clauses embody. Is there really anything
else to say? There must be. The just-concluded brief review notwithstanding, Kent Greenawalt has demonstrated that a "complexity of
considerations . . . bear on how civil law should permissibly involve
itself in matters of religious significance."9 0 Indeed,
[t]he aspiration for simple approaches is either deluded or badly
misguided. It is deluded if a proponent believes simple approaches
district court "properly withheld from the jury all questions concerning the truth or
falsity" of religious beliefs, while allowing the sincerity of those beliefs to be
determined).
84 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 886-87 (1990) ("It is no
more appropriate for judges to determine the 'centrality' of religious beliefs before
applying a 'compelling interest' test in the free exercise field, than it would be for
them to determine the 'importance' of ideas before applying the 'compelling interest' test in the free speech field."); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989)
("It is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or
practices to a faith ....
).
85 See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409 (1985) (concluding that New York
City's "system for monitoring the religious content of publicly funded Title I classes in
... religious schools . . . inevitably results in the excessive entanglement of church
and state"); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 607 (1971) (holding that a state law
allowing superintendants to reimburse Catholic schools for supplies and salaries
caused excessive entanglement and therefore was unconstitutional).
86 VoLoum, supra note 59, at 916-21 (discussing "no delegation to religious institutions" principle under which "the government may not delegate certain kinds of
government power to religious institutions").
87 Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 1844.
88 Program, supra note 1.
89 See id.
90 Greenawalt, supra note 81, at 843.
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will yield results sensitive to the nuances of our religious and social
life. It is misguided if a proponent recognizes the Procrustean quality of simple approaches, but thinks their clarity and determinacy
are worth the price of unhappy outcomes. 9 1
III.
Perhaps we should start again. What does it mean, really, for a
court-and, more generally, for the political authority-to take a
"hands-off approach to religious doctrine"? And, why might we think
such an approach is required by the commitment to religious freedom
that is reflected in the Religion Clauses of our Constitution? In what
way does such a rule serve-or, might it actually undermine, if misconstructed or misapplied-the complex of values that, we think, are
both the foundation and end of those provisions?9 2 Notwithstanding
the impressive array of authorities we can cite for the rule, it seems
worthwhile-even important-to get clear about what the rule is not,
and about what does not require or justify it.
For starters, it is certainly not the case that government officials
and courts may not render decisions that touch upon, affect, motivate,
or even regulate religious believers and religiously motivated activities.
James Madison famously insisted that "Religion is wholly exempt from
[the] cognizance" of "the institution of Civil Society," 9- but, of course,
it is clearly not true that our courts and governments are not aware of,
take no notice of, or refuse to acknowledge or recognize "religion. '94
91

Id.
Cf 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 6-13 (listing and explaining a number of
"interrelated values lying behind nonestablishment of religion").
93 Madison, supra note 38, 1, at 22. Madison's use of the term "Civil Society"a term that, in contemporary usage, refers not so much to the institutions of government as to the intermediate space and associations between persons and the statecomplicates the task of evaluating his claim.
94 Vincent Blasi has observed that:
If "cognizance" in this context means "knowledge," "awareness," "notice," or
"acknowledgment," surely a voucher system takes such cognizance of religion. Just as surely, under that interpretation a no-cognizance principle is a
practical impossibility in the modem welfare state, or for that matter even in
the minimal state of Madison's day.
Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 783, 789 (2002) (footnote omitted). Madison's point, instead, Blasi continues, is a jurisdictional one: "[T]he civil
magistrate has no responsibility whatsoever for the way each citizen understands and
discharges his duty to the Creator." Id. In any event, and as Philip Hamburger has
observed, the provision that Madison actually proposed for inclusion in the Bill of
Rights was a "far cry from [the position] that religion [is] 'wholly exempt' from the

92
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"Religion" does not exist, never has existed, and could not exist in a
sphere entirely separate from the public, civic, legal, or political.
"Religion" and law are (almost) everywhere, and so there is no avoiding contact between them. As Chris Eisgruber and Larry Sager
reminded us recently, it is not useful-it is not even possible-to
speak of "church" and "state," or "religion" and "politics," as entirely
separate. 95 Or, as Justice William Douglas wrote, in Zorach v. Clauson,9 6 the idea that the "separation" of church and state "must be complete and unequivocal" does not and could not mean that "the state
and religion [must] be aliens to each other."9 7 In the context of the
modern, activist, welfare state, a "see no religion" understanding of
the relationship, or "nexus, '98 between the civil and the sacred seems
neither possible nor desirable. Such an understanding of "separation," and of the content of religious freedom, simply does not connect with the world we inhabit or with who and what we are. "The
question," then, "is not whether the state should be permitted to affect
religion or religion permitted to affect the state; the question is how
they should be permitted to affect each other." 99 The hands-off rule
should not be understood to suggest or require otherwise.
If this point seems too obvious to mention, even for deck-clearing
purposes, we might recall, in a cautionary way, the back-and-forth
between Justices Black and Rutledge, in the landmark case Everson v.
Board ofEducation.0 0 Responding to Justice Black's argument that the
cognizance of civil society." PHILIP
105 (2002).
95 CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER &
CONSTITUTION

HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND

STATE

LAWRENCE G. SAGER, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND THE

6-7 (2007).

96

343 U.S. 306 (1952).

97
98

Id. at 312.
My colleague, Robert Rodes, has used the term "nexus"-rather than, for

example, "wall of separation"-in his church-state work. See, e.g., Rodes, supra note
39. The word is, I think, a helpful one. As I have written elsewhere, the word "suggests a relation, even a symbiosis, between two distinct things-neither a collapse of
one into the other nor a rigid segregation of the one from the other." Richard W.
Garnett, Tribute, Pluralism, Dialogue, and Freedom: Professor Robert Rodes and the ChurchState Nexus, 22 J.L. & RELIGION 503, 512 (2006-07); see also Thomas L. Shaffer, The
ChristianJurisprudenceof Robert E. Rodes, Jr., 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 737, 757 (1998)
("[T]he foundation of [Rodes'] church-state theory is that the two are so intertwined-so much the remnant of Christendom-that they could not part even if they
wanted to.").
99 EISGRUBER & SAGER, supranote 95, at 7; see also, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 35, § 1411, at 1232 ("[I]t is inevitable that at least some disputes affecting religion or touching the interests of religious institutions will be brought before the civil courts or
other secular agencies.").
100 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 84:2

Establishment Clause requires "the state to be a neutral in its relations
with groups of religious believers and non-believers,"''1 1 Justice Rutledge insisted that the "purpose" of the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses was "not to strike merely at the official establishment of a single sect ....
[T]he object was broader ....
It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious activity
and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion."'10 2 To repeat: such a "comprehensive"
separation is impossible and would be undesirable, and is also not
comprehended within any plausible version or formulation of the
hands-off approach.
Next, it is not the case that courts committed to a hands-off or
"no religious decisions" approach may not ask questions or render
decisions about "religion." Indeed, such decisions could hardly be
avoided by a court charged with interpreting our First Amendment.
What's more, as Kent Greenawalt has explained, such courts must,
given their charge, "sometimes decide whether a claim, activity, organization, purpose, or classification is religious." 10 3 "Religion" must be
identified, and defined, if its "free exercise" is to be protected and its
"establishment" avoided. To be sure, defining "religion"-even in a
rough-and-ready way-is a complicated and delicate task. 10 4 Still,
there's no evading it. And, when carrying it out, we should not expect
to be able to avoid entirely "the interpretation of religious practice
and belief."10 5
Finally, if-as was suggested above-it is a mistake to think of the
hands-off rule as merely an implication of or corollary to a constitu101 Id. at 18.
102 Id. at 31-32 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
103 Kent Greenawalt, Religion As a Concept in ConstitutionalLaw, 72 CAL. L. REV.
753, 753 (1984).
104 For more on the interesting problem of defining religion, and of the connection between this problem and the enterprise of providing judicially enforceable protection to religious freedom, see generally WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, THE
IMPOSSIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 89-137 (2005) (describing law and society's various attempts at defining religion); Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First
Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 587-604 (discussing how to create an "ideal"
constitutional definition of religion); Greenawalt, supranote 103, at 756-62, 776-807
(discussing how courts should undertake the "threshold" question of defining religion in religious liberty cases); Koppelman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 111-20) (delivering a proposal for defining "religion" for constitutional purposes); Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 125-40 (2002) (attempting to reconstruct the secular purpose doctrine through a more clear method for defining religion); Eduardo Pefialver, Note, The Concept of Religion, 107 YALE L.J. 791, 814-21
(1997) (arguing for an "evolving" constitutional definition of religion).
105 See Program, supra note 1.
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tional commitment to "religion blindness," it also seems misguided to
see the rule simply as the specification of a general "neutrality"
requirement. Although there are, as Douglas Laycock and others
have shown, different ways of understanding the idea, and the goal, of
"neutrality" in the law-and-religion context, 10 6 our Constitution is
not-and a secular political community does not have to be-strictly
"neutral" with respect to religion. The "free exercise" of religion, it
seems to me, is constitutionally protected not by accident, and not as a
kind of lesser-included form of equality, liberty, or autonomy; 10 7 or as
a grudging concession to the lingering idiosyncrasies of some.
Instead, John Garvey probably got it right when he observed that our
Constitution protects the freedom of religion because it thinks-that
is, because we think-that religion (broadly understood) is a "good
thing. 1 0 8 As Andy Koppelman has explained, in several places and

with great care, our Constitution does, and so our governments may,

106 See Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward
Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993 (1990) [hereinafter Laycock, DisaggregatedNeutrality];
Douglas Laycock, Substantive Neutrality Revisited, 110 W. VA. L. REv. 51 (2007) [hereinafter Laycock, Substantive Neutrality].
107 But see, e.g., EISGRUBER & SAGER, supra note 95, at 109 (describing Justice
O'Connor's argument that religious freedom is of "a lesser status than . . . free
speech"); James W. Nickel, Who Needs Freedom of Religion?, 76 U. COLO. L. REv. 941
(2005) (arguing that freedom of religion can derive from our other individual freedoms and is therefore disposable as a distinct category).
108 SeeJOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 49 (1996). Garvey's view is
consonant with the one presented in the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on
Religious Freedom promulgated by Pope Pius VI in 1965. SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL, DIGNITATIS HUMANAE

[DECLARATION

ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM]

(1965)

[hereinafter DIGNITATIS HuMANAE], available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/ii-vatican_council/documents/vat-ii-decl 19651207_dignitatis-humanae_
en.html. There, the Council fathers affirmed the link between a "sense of the dignity
of the human person" and the right to the "free exercise of religion," id. 1, while
insisting that,
[g]overnment ... ought indeed to take account of the religious life of the
citizenry and show it favor, since the function of government is to make provision for the common welfare. However, it would clearly transgress the limits set to its power, were it to presume to command or inhibit acts that are
religious.
Id. 3; cf Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1, 9, 11 (2000) (noting that "[t]he very text of the Constitution 'singles out'
governmental acts respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the exercise
of religion for special protections that are not accorded to any aspect of human life,"
but also insisting that "[n]ot only must religion be 'unimpaired,' . . . it must also be
unsponsored, uncontrolled, and unpromoted").
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treat religion-again, broadly understood-as a valuable thing, a
human good, and a worthy pursuit. 10 9
Now, to note, as I did above, 110 that "religion" must sometimes be
defined by courts if its exercise is to be protected by courts is certainly
not to say that it is easy for courts to define "religion."'1 1 ' Similarly, to
say that our Constitution treats religion as a good thing-that is, to say
that governments may and should accommodate religion and should
attend to the conditions in which religious freedom thrives-is not to
deny or slight the legal and moral limits that do and should constrain
this treatment.1 12 It is to suggest, though, that the hands-off rule is
not about "blindness" or "neutrality," and also that the rule's content
and rationale should be consistent with-and should, at least in part,
take their shape from-the idea that religion and religious freedom
are human goods that deserve protection and promotion. Yes, such a
rule flows from the Constitution's Religion Clauses-not from these
provisions' indifference, skepticism, or even fears about religion but
rather from their respect and solicitude for it, and from the religious
1 13
premises which they reflect.
IV.

The hands-off rule, then, is not a rule that courts and civil authorities should not make decisions about, involving, or even affirming of
religion and its exercise. It is, instead, a rule that state actors should
not render religious decisions-decisions involving the resolution of
religious questions or the enforcement of religious obligations;1 14 we
109 See Andrew Koppelman, Is It Fairto Give Religion Special Treatment?, 2006 U. ILL.
L. REv. 571 (arguing that it is fair for government to privilege religion, so long as it
does so abstractly).
110 See supra notes 103-105 and accompanying text.
111 See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 104, at 138-59 (noting that the religion of
ordinary people "fits uneasily into the spaces allowed for religion in the public square
and in the courtroom").
112 See, e.g., DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 108, 3 ("No... human power can
either command or prohibit [religious] acts . . ").
113 See generally Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 153-66 (1991) (describing the religious world
view that historically underlies our constitutional commitment to religious freedom).
114 Cf Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 735 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[W] hile there may be a number of good arguments that
civil courts of a State should, as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid
adjudicating religious disputes to the maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications.").
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should not, the rule would suggest, use secular law to assure obser1 15
vance of practices with religious significance.
But, why not? In the relevant commentary and cases-including
Presbyterian Church and the other intrachurch-dispute cases cited
above-one encounters a number of different explanations and justifications for the requirement. 116 This is not necessarily a cause for
concern. After all, the First Amendment serves a number of purposes
and promotes a number of goods; it should not come as a big surprise
that there have been offered, and are, a number of good reasons for
such a provision and the judicial rules that help to implement it.117
And again, Kent Greenawalt has shown the "complexity of considerations that bear on how civil law should permissibly involve itself in
matters of religious significance.
The aspiration for simple
18
approaches is either deluded or badly misguided."'
That said, and admittedly wary of the risk of slipping into delusion, I want to suggest that some of the justifications often invoked for
the rule are not entirely satisfactory and that, accordingly, allowing
such justifications to shape the rule and its applications could also be
"misguided." In perhaps an even riskier move, I will also suggest that,
notwithstanding the "complexity of [the relevant] considerations," 1 9
one particular justification for the hands-off rule should have primacy
20
of place. 1
First, the hands-off rule is sometimes presented as an implication
of the purported fact that-in Professor Kauper's words-" 'religious
truth by its nature [is] not subject to a test of validity determined by
115 Greenawalt argues for the application of this rule in Religious Law and Civil
Law: Using Secular Law to Assure Observance of Practices with Religious Significance, supra
note 81, at 781.
116 See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 35, § 14-11, at 1232-42; Koppelman, supra note 8
(manuscript at 7) ("A theme that runs through this area of the law is the state's
incompetence to decide matters that relate to the interpretation of religious practice
or belief."); Levine, supra note 2, at 85-86 ("Justices have provided various rationales
for the Court's approach. Some Justices have suggested practical justifications ....
Other Justices have cited constitutional considerations ....").
117 See generally 2 GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 6-13 (listing and explaining a
number of "interrelated values lying behind nonestablishment of religion"); JOHN
WrrTE, JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 41 (2d ed.
2005) ("Puritans, Evangelicals, Republicans, and Enlightenment exponents-these
four groups of founders held up the four corners of the wide and swaying canopy of
opinion on religious liberty in eighteenth-century America.").
118 Greenawalt, supra note 81, at 843.
119 See id.
120 Some of the discussion that follows is adapted from an earlier work of mine.
See Richard W. Garnett, The Freedom of the Church, 4J. CATH. Soc. THOUGHT 59 (2006).
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rational thought and empiric knowledge."' 121 In other words, the
argument goes, courts may not answer religious questions, or declare
religious truths, because they-and we- cannot. Religious claims and
arguments are simply not the kind of things that can be false-or
true. 122 At the end of the day, religion is all mystery and mysticism;
there's no "there" there for the judicial mind or judicial methods to
latch onto. 123 On this view, the possibility of "natural theology," and
the conversation and relationship between "faith" and "reason," are of
interest only to medievalists. Faith simply is non-reason, and it operates in and speaks to realms where reason has no place or little
purchase. The Justices nodded to such a rationale in the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese case, when they stated that "it is the essence of
religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be
accepted as matters of faith [,] whether or not rational or measurable
124
by objective criteria."
It is not clear, though, that "religious" questions defy "reasoned"
analysis or resolution. Jared Goldstein has contended, for example,
that a great many "positive questions about religion" 125-to say nothing about questions of natural theology-are perfectly amenable to
non-mystical methods of inquiry, and can be answered without
recourse to revelation.1 2 6 What's more, Professor Kauper's claim itself
seems ironically to depend on contestable theological premises about
the nature and objects of religious belief. A different view-with
respect to Christianity-was offered by John Henry Cardinal Newman
who insisted, more than a century ago:
Christianity has been long enough in the world to justify us in
dealing with it as a fact in the world's history. Its .

.

. doctrines,

precepts, and objects cannot be treated as matters of private opinion or deduction ....

121

TRIBE,

It may indeed legitimately be made the sub-

supra note 35, § 14-11, at 1232 n.46 (quoting PAUL G.

AND THE CONSTITUTION

KAUPER, RELIGION

26 (1964)).

122 Cf NOONAN, supra note 14, at 169 (noting, in the context of a discussion of the
Ballard case, that for a "majority of judges" the "test of belief being religious was the
sincerity with which the belief was held" and not the "content of the belief").
123 See Madhavi Sunder, Piercingthe Veil, 112 YALE L.J. 1399, 1415-25 (2003) (noting that "religion" is "constructed" in liberal theory as private, entirely beyond reason
and its methods).
124 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 714-15 (1976)
(footnote omitted).
125 Jared A. Goldstein, Is There a "Religious Question" Doctrine? JudicialAuthority to
Examine Religious Practicesand Beliefs, 54 CATH. U. L. REv. 497, 533 (2005).
126 See id.
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ject-matter of theories. . . . It has long since passed beyond the
letter of documents and the reasonings of individual minds ....127

Second, the concern animating the hands-off rule is sometimes
framed as a concession to judicial incompetence in the face of unfamiliar, challenging, esoteric materials. 128 Religious doctrine questions
are, it is thought, too tricky or specialized for them to tackle. 129 True,
tax, patent, and F.E.R.C. I 30 cases can be tricky and specialized, but
they are harder for courts to avoid (even if they try). On this view, it is
not that religion is too irrational-too weird-for judges; it is just that
religious doctrine questions are too hard.' 3 ' To be sure, there is little
reason (anymore) to expect that lawyers and judges will have the
training necessary to decide doctrinal, let alone theological, questions. 132 And, in any event, it might seem that allowing or asking even
skilled state actors to make and enforce decisions about church doctrine and discipline seems a bit like asking Mayor Bloomberg to conduct the New York Philharmonic, or inviting the Green Party to
compose and parse the Libertarian Party's platform.
But the fact thatjudges charged with deciding legal questions are
usually unfamiliar with religious texts, doctrines, and traditions would
not seem to require, as a principled matter, a strong hands-off rule.
Judges answer hard questions, untangle complicated problems, and
educate themselves about new fields, all the time. They hear testi127 JOHN HENRY NEWAMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE
3 (6th ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 1989) (1845); see also Sunder, supra note 123, at
1423 ("[R]eligion is much more ...subject to reasoned argument and change than
earlier theorists acknowledged.").
128 See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715 (1981) ("Intrafaith differences... are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial
process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences ....
");Serbian E. Orthodox
Diocese, 426 U.S. at 714 n.8 ("Civil judges obviously do not have the competence of
ecclesiastical tribunals in applying the 'law' that governs ecclesiastical disputes ....
");
Watson v.Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1872) ("It is not to be supposed that the
judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and religious
faith of [church] bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own.").
129 See sources cited supra note 128.
130 The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (F.E.R.C.) is an independent
agency responsible for regulating interstate transmission of oil, gas, and electricity.
For more information on what F.E.R.C. does and how it operates, see About FERC,
http://www.ferc.gov/about/about.asp (last visited Nov. 23, 2008).
131 In his discussion of the Ballard case, Judge Noonan suggests a variation on the

judicial-incompetence rationale, noting that "an empathetic pilgrimage of the imagination" would seem to be a "necessary condition for judging a religious claim" and
asking, "can a judge be a pilgrim?" NOONAN, supra note 14, at 176.
132 See Levine, supra note 2, at 88 ("[I]t is sensible that courts should not serve as
...

theology board [s]....").
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mony; they listen to experts; they consider arguments. That we do not
think government officials may or should "declare religious truth"
does not mean-or, at least, it need not always mean-that they cannot take judicial notice of the fact that, say, ham-and-cheese sandwiches are not Kosher. A court that believes it can decide which rules
and practices are, and are not, essential to the game of golfa 33 proba-

bly does not lack the ability merely to confirm, or take judicial notice
of the fact, that the Roman Catholic Church teaches that "Jesus of
Nazareth . . .is the eternal Son of God made man." 13 4 Many "relig-

135
ious" questions are hard, but not all of them are hard.
A third support for the hands-off rule is the "idea that religion
can be damaged and degraded by state involvement with it. 1l36 This
justification for the rule builds, of course, on premises about the
nature and good of religion, and also about its vulnerability to corruption through government meddling. Andrew Koppelman shows, in
his own contribution to this volume, that there is not-or, at least,
that there need not be-any inconsistency between the Constitution's
no-establishment command and a rule rooted in the view that religion
is a good and valuable thing. 13 7 And he is right, I think, to highlight
the historic and theoretical importance of this concern about
"corruption., 13 8

It is not obvious, though, that all decisions of the type that are
sometimes said to be prohibited by the hands-off rule threaten to corrupt or undermine the vulnerable good of religion. Indeed, as
Samuel Levine has argued, in some cases and contexts, courts' failures
to take up questions involving religious questions-their excessive
"aversion to 'comparative theology'"-present dangers of their
own.1 39 In other words, to join Professor Koppelman in affirming that
governments should observe the hands-off rule precisely in order to
avoid "corrupting," through their interference, the good of religion is
not to specify the rule's content and reach. We can affirm that governments may elect to avoid "religious decisions" in order to avoid
corrupting the good of religion without maintaining that, in fact, all
133 See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 682-83 (2001).
134 CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 423, at 106 (2d ed. 2000).
135 Cf Greenawalt, supra note 81, at 839 ("[S]traightforward determinations of
religious requirements by civil courts may be appropriate if these determinations
serve secular interests.").
136 See Koppelman, supra note 8 (manuscript at 14).
137 See Andrew Koppelman, The Troublesome Religious Roots of Religious Neutrality, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REv. 865, 869-70 (2009).
138 See id. at 870.
139 Levine, supra note 2,at 131.
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"religious decisions" by courts and public officials actually do corrupt
or degrade that good. It could well be, as Madison thought, that
"ecclesiastical establishments" undermine the "purity and efficacy" of
religion, and yield the unpleasant "fruits" of "pride and indolence in
the Clergy; ignorance and servility in the laity." 140 This does not
mean-or, at least, it does not establish-that governments may not
take notice of, or come to conclusions about, religious doctrines and
teachings.
Another, fourth, reason for the hands-off rule is the idea that
matters of religious doctrine-its content, development, transmission,
and so forth-are simply of no interest to civil, secular authorities.
The reason for refusing to get involved in "religious" questions, then,
is that there is no good reason to get involved. This disclaimer of any
such "interest" in matters of religious doctrine is unsurprising, of
course; it is of a piece with the much-remarked "privatization" of religion generally, both in liberal theory and in constitutional doctrine
14 1
and rhetoric.
At least two responses are possible here: First, it seems clear-and
the cases, by their very existence, would seem to establish-that it
often is necessary for courts and other officials to confront "religious"
142
questions when doing what they ordinarily and appropriately do.
Next, the meaning, movement, and implications of religious teachings
unavoidably are and have long been both the subjects and objects of
government power and policy. It is simply not the case that governments like ours are, can, or even should be entirely indifferent to
140 Madison, supra note 38, 7, at 24.
141 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[Our] Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice .

. . .");

see also Gerard V.

Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Privatization"Theoy of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST.

Louis U. L.J. 275, 280-317 (1986) (describing and evaluating the Supreme Court's
normative jurisprudence of "private" religion); Richard W. Garnett, A Quiet Faith?
Taxes, Politics, and the Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C. L. REv. 771, 795-98 (2001)
(describing the Supreme Court's approach to "privatizing religion" and arguing that
such an approach inappropriately requires religion to reform its conception of itself);
cf Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the Privatizationof Religion, 41 CATH. U. L.
REV. 19, 58 (1991) (explaining that, despite the privatization thesis' "significant role"
in shaping establishment clause doctrine, there has been a shift "toward the view that
religion has a valuable role to play in the public realm").
142 See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 735 (1976)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[W] hile there may be a number of good arguments that
civil courts of a State should, as a matter of the wisest use of their authority, avoid
adjudicating religious disputes to the maximum extent possible, they obviously cannot avoid all such adjudications.").
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religion's claims and content. 143 Indeed, I have suggested elsewhere
that it is precisely because secular, liberal, democratic governments
like ours do have an "interest" in the content, and therefore in the
"development," of religious doctrine-an interest that such governments will quite understandably pursue-that religious freedom is so
44
fragile.'
Now, Nelson Tebbe examines, in an important, recent article, the
question "whether and how it is appropriate for a democracy to influence citizen choice concerning commitments of conscience."' 145
Tebbe's precise claim is that it is permissible-indeed, as was mentioned earlier, it is to be expected-for liberal democracies to "skew
private incentives toward nonreligious activities and messages, so long
as [they] observe[] certain [constitutional] limitations."' 46 Governments may, in other words, try to "influence citizens' choices among
competing commitments of conscience,"' 147 and may encourage citizens to pursue certain comprehensive commitments rather than
others. This seems correct. Governments not only may, but inevitably
will, try to convince citizens to endorse favored commitments. In so
doing, it seems clear that they will unavoidably take account of, and
evaluate, the religious doctrines and theological traditions that, for so
many, supply the "commitments" that they are trying to move or
transform.
There are, Tebbe insists, limits on such efforts: In so "convinc[ing]" and "encourag[ing]," Tebbe maintains, governments "may
not . . . be driven by simple animus against religion.' 1 48 And, he
argues, they may not single out particular sects or groups for exclusion, even because of their illiberal activites and beliefs, or in order to
"further[] a legitimate policy objective."1 49 After all, "sectarian prefer143

See generally STEVEN D.

SMITH, GETTING OVER EQUALITY:

A CRITICAL DIAGNOSIS

(2001) (arguing that courts should pursue the
value of tolerance over a blind neutrality and that such tolerance is achievable precisely because of "our theistic heritage and commitments"); Stanley Fish, Mission
Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between Church and State, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2255
(1997) (critiquing classical liberal justifications for toleration on the basis that government will inevitably favor the beliefs and values it prefers).
144 See Garnett, supra note 31, at 1693-700.
145 Nelson Tebbe, Excluding Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 1263, 1270 (2008). For
additional discussion of Tebbe's article, see Richard W. Garnett, "ExcludingReligion":
A Response, 157 U. PA. L .REv. PENNUMBRA (forthcoming 2008), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1300604.
146 Tebbe, supra note 145, at 1267.
147 Id. at 1335.
148 Id. at 1327.
149 Id. at 1321.
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entialism is ... odious." 150 Is it really? Is it always? After all, we invariably care, and so our governments care too, what-and in what-our
fellow citizens believe. 15 1 We think it matters what they value, and it
matters to and for what they aspire. We care, therefore, what our fellows are taught; it matters to us how and by whom they are formed.
Claims to the contrary, even when couched in the compelling language of pluralism and limited government, are at best disingenuous.
We might very well decide, and for very good reasons, to stay our
and our governments' hands from trying to control too closely the
commitments and values of others. Although we care about these values, and about who transmits them, we might nonetheless elect to
assume the risks that seem to inhere in the idea of a free, pluralistic,
democratic society, 152 keeping in mind Judge McConnell's fear that
"it is difficult or impossible for a liberal state to engage in the direct
inculcation of public virtue without compromising its liberal commitment to neutrality among the different and competing reasonable
worldviews of the society."' 1 3 We might doubt the government's ability to engage effectively in such "direct inculcation of public virtue,"
particularly via means as seemingly treacherous to religious freedom
as policies directed at the content of religious doctrine. Notwithstanding the interest-again, the secular interest-in the substance and
development of such doctrine, we could easily and wisely decide that
the risks are too great. Such a decision, though, would not transform
154
the government's interest into an "ecclesiastical" one.
There is, finally, the most ancient rationale of all, namely, that
secular authorities lack the power to answer some questions- religious
questions-whose resolution is, under an appropriately pluralistic
political theory, left to other institutions. 1 55 It is not that religious
questions are hard, weird, or irrelevant; 156 it is that they are questions
15 7
that the political authority lacks power, or jurisdiction, to answer.
150 Id. at 1320.
151 See Garnett, supra note 31, at 1693.
152 See Michael W. McConnell, The New Establishmentarianism,75 CHI.-KENT L. REv.
453, 457-58 (2000) (observing that "a liberal society is always at risk" and is "vulnerable at its foundations").
153 Id. at 455.
154 See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
155 See, e.g., DIGNITATIs HUMANAE, supra note 108, 9113 ("The freedom of the
Church is the fundamental principle in what concerns the relations between the
Church and governments and the whole civil order.... [T]he Church claims freedom ... as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord, upon which there
rests, by divine mandate, the duty of... preaching the Gospel ..
156 See supra notes 121-134, 141-154 and accompanying text.
157

See supra notes 59-87 and accompanying text.
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This rationale, it seems to me, is not only the strongest; it also pulls
the hands-off rule from the margins of First Amendment esoterica to
the very heart of religious freedom and church-state separation, properly understood. I have suggested elsewhere that "the preservation of
the churches' moral and legal right to govern themselves in accord
with their own norms and in response to their own calling is our day's
most pressing religious freedom challenge. 15 8 Getting the hands-off
rule right is, it turns out, a crucial aspect of this challenge.
In addition, an examination of the hands-off rule provides an
occasion, and an opportunity, to remind ourselves that the aim of
what Steven Smith has called Americans' nineteenth-century "disestablishment decision" was not a religion-free culture, civil society, or
political conversation. 159 It was not thought at the Founding, nor
should it be thought today, that "religion" is something that an official
charged with enforcing, interpreting, executing, or legislating pursuant to our Constitution could hope to avoid. The goal of our disestablishment experiment, instead, was to disaggregate (and protect)
religious institutions and authorities from those of government.
Given this goal, Professor Smith was right, I believe, to suggest
more than twenty years ago that the First Amendment's no-establishment provision has a "two-fold" "essential task," namely, "to prevent
government from interfering in the internal affairs of religious institutions and, conversely, to prohibit religious institutions from directly
exercising governmental authority."' 60 The hands-off rule, then,
should be constructed and applied consistent with this task and, correctly understood, it seems to me that the rule serves the task well.
A similar point can be made with respect to the Free Exercise
Clause. Any plausible or attractive understanding of religious liberty,
and of the "free exercise" of religion, will reflect an appreciation for
the fact that religion is "exercise [d]" not only by individual persons,
but also in and by communities, groups, institutions, and associations. 16 1 As Douglas Laycock argued, in an influential and still timely
158 Garnett, supra note 98, at 521. For a very different view, see generally, for
example, Marci A. Hamilton, The Waterloo for the So-Called Church Autonomy Theory:
Widespread Clergy Abuse and Institutional Cover-up, 29 CARoozo L. REv. 225, 232-38
(2007) (criticizing the church-autonomy theory).
159 Steven D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955 (1989).
160 Id. at 1018; cf.2GREENAWALT, supra note 37, at 234 (noting that it is "doubtful"
whether religious communities "should be able to engage the power of government
directly on their behalf").
161 But see, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks, Three Questions About Hybrid Rights and
Religious Groups, 117 YALE LJ. POCKET PART 192 (2007), http://thepocketpart.org/
2008/03/24/gedicks.html ("Every once in a while the Court comes out with a deci-
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article, the institutional dimension of religious freedom is not captured entirely by judicial tests forbidding "entanglement" between
16 2
government authorities and religious institutions or activities.
There is also a "right to church autonomy," the "right of churches to
make for themselves the decisions that arise in the course of running
their institutions. 1 63 A hands-off rule can, and should, operate to vin64
dicate, and not to undermine, this right.
CONCLUSION

In 1952, Mark DeWolfe Howe examined the Kedroff case in his
Foreword to the Harvard Law Review's review of the Supreme Court's
just-concluded Term.' 65 Howe read the case as standing not merely
for a judicial policy of avoiding strange or difficult questions, but
instead as pointing to a longstanding and important "problem of
political theory," namely, the
pluralistic thesis ...

that government must recognize that it is not

the sole possessor of sovereignty, and that private groups within the
community are entitled to lead their own free lives and exercise
within the area of their competence an authority so effective as to
justify labeling it a sovereign authority. 1 66

The reasoning in Kedroff, he insisted, "[n]ot only . . .impl[ies] that
the Church as a spiritual body has liberties which will be given protection directly rather than derivatively, but it gives that protection to
liberties which, in their essence, differ from those possessed by the
members of the Church."1' 67 The hands-off rule, it seems to me,
sion that hints at a doctrine of first-order group rights, which tempts law review commentators... to write futilely detailed accounts of the need for a first-order doctrine
and what it should look like .... At this point, the smart money says that hints are all
that a first-order group rights doctrine is ever going to be." (footnotes omitted)).
162 See Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case of
Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373,
1393-94 (1981).
163 Id. at 1394. See generally Garnett, supra note 120 (discussing the idea of libertas
ecclesiae, or the freedom of the Church, in American constitutional law).
164

As was noted earlier, Professor Levine has warned that the hands-off rule can,

if misapplied or misconstructed, "lead to a number of disturbing results." See Levine,
supra note 2, at 86.
165 Mark DeWolfe Howe, The Supreme Court, 1952 Term-Foreword: Political Theory
and the Nature of Liberty, 67 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1953).
166 Id. at 91.
167 Id. at 92. Howe suggested-going beyond the Court in Kedroff---that the decision's "pluralism" could justifiably be extended to other entities, including "schools
and universities." Id. at 94.
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should be oriented primarily-we need not say "exclusively"-toward
these liberties. And what would it look like if it were? Good question.

